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In this paper we analyze an authentication protocol so-called Pasargad which proposed by Arjemand et al. 
[1]. The Pasargad protocol is a distance bounding protocol which has been designed for RFID-based 
electronic voting systems. The designers have claimed that this protocol is more secure than Preneel and 
Single protocol [2], against relay attacks. However, in this paper, we present some efficient attacks against 
it. Our attacks include conditional impersonation attack and recovery key attack. Moreover, we show that 
this protocol has some structural flaw which may prevent to execution the protocol.  
 
KEYWORDS 




Radio frequency identification (RFID) system is composed of a Transponder (tag), reader and 
backend server. This technology can be used to link a user with a machine for authentication. 
First time, the RFID systems are used by the British Army during the Second World War, for 
identification friends/foes military aircraft. Now day, RFID systems have many applications like 
supply chain, access controlling, collecting road tolls, tracking animals, Passports, military and 
etc.  
 
One of the applications of RFID technology is electronic voting (e-voting) which is important to 
governments for elections. In e-voting systems, the voter must have a smart card or memory card 
instead of the paper bolts in a traditional voting system. This card can be an RFID tag.  An e-
voting system should satisfy the following criteria 
 
• Authentication: only authorized voters can vote. 
• Uniqueness : voter cannot vote more than once. 
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• Accuracy : voting system should record the votes. 
• Integrity : no one can modify the votes. 
• Verification : voters should be able to verify whether votes have been counted correctly. 
• Reliability : voting system should work robustly. 
• Secrecy : in voting system no one should be able to determine how an individual voted. 
• Flexibility : voting system should uses equipments that can handle verity of ballot 
questions formats. 
• User friendly : voter should be able to vote with minimal equipments. 
 
For more information on e-voting systems based on distance bounding protocols, we suggest the 
interested reader to read [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. So, we prefer reader to the significant number of 
publications analysis distance bounding protocols, for instance [10, 11, 12, 13].  
 
Firstly, distance bounding protocols are introduced by Brands and Chaum [14]. Distance 
bounding protocols were used in some e-voting systems. So far, several protocols have been 
proposed based on distance bounding for e-voting systems [5, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Recently, 
Arjemand et al. [1] have proposed a new distance bounding protocol as called Pasargad protocol. 
Designers of Pasargad protocol claimed that this protocol is resistance against of known attacks. 
 
In this paper, we show Pasargad Protocol is actually insecure by presenting conditional 
impersonation attack and key recovery attack.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized by introducing the structure of Pasargad protocol which has 
been mentioned in section 2. After that, we analyze Pasargad protocol in section 3. Finally, the 
conclusion is given in section 4.  
 
2. Description of the Pasargad Protocol 
 




,Alice BobStr Str  
: String generated by Alice and Bob, respectively.  
 
Huff   :  Huffman coding.  
 
HuffU : Decoding with Huffman algorithm. 
 
1 2,St St  
:  Source coding or output from Huffman algorithm. 
 
ParsP : Protocol Pars operation. 
 
Pars
PU : Protocol Pars decoding operation. 
 
1 2 3, ,s s s : Bit Strings with length K .  
 









a b : i-th character of AliceStr  and BobStr  , respectively.   
 
K : Secret key shared between the tag and the reader.  
 
⊕ : Bitwise exclusive or.  
 
A, B : Honest prover and verifier (principals). 
 
,A B  
:  Malicious prover and verifier or intruders. 
 
A B→ : Assigning the value of A to B. 
 
2.2 Distance Bounding 
 
In distance bounding protocols, it is assumed that principals (A, B, …) can compute the time of 
sending and receiving of messages. The most accurate method of distance estimation is to use the 
time of flight signal. For measuring round trip time, two principal (A and B) perform a challenge- 
response in the protocol. One of the entities, for example A (reader), sends a challenge and starts 
a timer. After receiving the challenge, B (tag) does some computations to construct the response. 
The response is sent back to A and the timer is stopped.  The propagation speed of the signal and 
round trip time is known. Therefore, the distance between the reader and the tag is easily 
calculated.  
 
Desmetet et al. suggested a distance bounding protocol which is resistance to mafia attack [3, 4]. 
The first distance bounding protocol was designed by Brands and Chaum based on the idea of 
Desmetet et al. In this protocol, it has been used of round trip time for exchanged messages [5]. 
Generally, if the tag be in admissible neighborhood of the reader then distance bounding protocol 




                        Figure 1: Tag in the admissible neighborhood of a reader [27] 
 
Several papers have been published about distance bounding protocol in order to thwart the relay 
attacks [17-27]. Generally, we describe other scenario attacks for distance bounding protocol in 
figure 2.  
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Figure 2: a) Man-in-the-middle(MIM) attack with an inside adversary, b) Man-in-the-middle(MIM) attack 
with an outside adversary, c) Distance fraud attack, d) Impersonation fraud attack, e) Mafia/Terrorist frauds 
attacks [27]. 
 
The Fig. 2-a  shows that adversary can set admissible distance between the tag and the reader, 
then he/she does man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack. The Fig. 2-b shows that adversary can set 
outside distance between the tag and the reader and then he/she does MIM attack. The Fig. 2-c 
shows that the tag set outside distance bound of the reader and then he/she does distance fraud 
attack. The Fig. 2-d shows that adversary can set admissible distance bound the tag and the 
reader, then he/she does impersonation attack and in Fig. 2-e can be seen if adversary can set 
admissible distance the tag and the reader, then he/she does Mafia/Terrorist attack. 
 
2.3 Pasargad Protocol Overview 
 
The authors of Pasargad protocol claim that this protocol is suitable for e-voting system. The 
Pasargad protocol is designed based on distance bounding that prevent voter's identity falsification 
and the voter cannot change itself vote by mafia attack [1]. So the authors claimed that the 
Pasargad protocol is resistance than Preneel and Single’s protocol [2]. The success probability of 
attacker in Preneel and Singelee’s protocol, is 1/2, but in the Pasargad protocol, success probability 
of attacker decreases to 
162 .−   
 
The structure of the Pasargad protocol includes two algorithms: Pars and Huffman algorithms, 
which will be described in the next subsection. The Pasargad protocol has two phases of identity 
verification and distance bounding identification. The identity verification phase is depicted in 
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Figure 3: Identity verification [1] 
 
2.4 Phase Detection Distance Bounding 
 




 Figure 4: Distance bounding identification [1] 
 
In this phase characters message send between Alice and Bob as follows: 
 
• Alice runs Pars algorithm on the ith character from string strBob, (Pars(bi)=Bi)’ 
• Then Alice turns on its chronometer and sends Bi to Bob. 
• Bob receives Bi and then computes bi with pars Algorithm. 
• Bob runs Pars algorithm on input   (the i
th
 character from string strAlice) and output Pars 
(ai) = Ai, then sends to Alice.  
• Alice upon receipt Ai, decrypts it and obtains ai then turns off its chronometer. 
• Alice computes ∆t, the time between send and receive message, if ∆ ≤ 	 then 
protocol is run. Otherwise, the protocol has failed. 
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2.5 Pars algorithm 
 
Now, we describe Pars algorithm, in this algorithm used ASCII code (any character in ASCII code 
equal one byte and we have 256 states for any byte). In Parse Algorithm encoded three characters 
(three byte) into four segments. For example we show encoding any byte with a symbol in table 1. 
 
Table 1: encoding in Pars algorithm [1] 
Byte 3 Byte 2  Byte 1 
$$$$$$$$ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ######## 
 
These 24 bits are divided to four equal segments. Therefore, table 1 converted to table 2 as 
follows: 
Table 2: Process of dividing three byte to four segments in pars algorithm [1] 
segment 4 Segment3 segment 2 segment 1 
$$$$$$ ∗∗∗∗ $$ ## ∗∗∗∗ ###### 
 
Based on Table 2, instead of 256 states in ASCII code we have 64 states for any segment, which 
including 26 English capital letters (A,B,…,Z), 26 English lower case letters (a,b,…,z), numbers 
(0,1,…,9) and two characters "/" and "+". So this process makes a new encoding which is called 
base 64 in Table 3 as follows: 
 
Table 3.Base 64 in Pars protocol [1] 
 
 
We illustrate encoding Pars algorithm with an example. Pick up word "Hello" according this 
algorithm, first "Hello" is divided into two segments "Hel" and "lo", since second part is 
incomplete (any segment which congruent in mod 3 is complete). If a word be incomplete then 
with concatenated the character "=" until word converts to complete as follows: 
 
Table 4.ASCII code word "Hello" 
     ℎ 
111 108 108 101 72   
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"Hel" in ASCII code =01001000 01100101 01101100  
“Hel” In Base 64= 010010 000110 010101 101100="SGVs" 
“lo” in ASCII code=01101100 01101111 
Since “lo” is incomplete by concatenated two “0” bits and one “=” to end of word convert to 
complete segment. Then run Pars algorithm as follows:  
 011011 000110 1111** ****** 
So, "lo" in Base 64 converts to "bg8=" and word “Hello" encodes to"SGVsbg8="[1]. 
 
2.6 Huffman coding 
 
Pasargad protocol uses Huffman algorithm. In this method for two strings with equal length, if 
frequency be different for letters then length of coding will be different. This property creates a 
defect for Pasargad Protocol which we will use of this defect in structural analysis later. For clear 
this property we give following example: 
 
The frequency of the letters in phrase "The Pasargad is good" is given in table 5. 
 
Table 5.Frequancy letters 
 
Frequency symbol Frequency symbol 
1  1 # 
2 $ 1 ℎ 
2 % 1  
1   1 & 
2  3  
3 (& 2 ( 
 
So, the converting of the phrase "The Pasargad is good" according to above table with using 
Huffman coding shows in table 6 as follows: 
 
Table 6: Huffman code 
 
(  &  ℎ # symbol 
1010 100 0011 0010 0001 0000 code 
(&    % $  symbol 
011 111 0101 110 1011 0100 code 
 
0000000100100110011100101010001001011100110011010110100111011111111110 
This code has 70 bits length [1]. 
 
 If we want encode another string with the same length, but different letters, for example the 
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Table 7: Frequency letters of "Huffman code is good" 
 
Frequency symbol Frequency symbol 
1   1  
1 ( 1  
1 $ 1 ) 
2 * 1  
2 % 1 ! 
3  1  
3 (& 1  
 
Then, the output length of this phrase is 74 bits. 
 
3. Cryptanalysis of Pasargad Protocol 
  
We analyze the Pasargad protocol as several view point. Also, we argue structural analysis, 
conditional impersonation and key recovery attack.   
 
3.1 Structural Analysis 
 
In the first stage of phase identity verification, Alice chooses a String (StrAlice) and computes  +  by 
using Huffman algorithm as follow: 
str/012 → ** → + → +⨁5 →  +   
As already mention in subsection 2-6, Huffman algorithm cannot generate two strings with same 
length for two messages with different frequency letters and the same length. So, in the first stage 
cannot be carried out and protocol fails. We suggest cancel Huffman algorithm from this protocol. 
 
Another ambiguous in Pasargad protocol chooses 16 bits in distance bounding identification phase, 
which unadoptable with pars algorithm.  
 
3.2 Conditional Impersonation attack 
 
We analyze the security Pasargad protocol and demonstrate several weaknesses on this protocol. 
 
As already mention in section 2 (Fig. 2), we can choose one of those scenario for identity 















Figure 5: Conditional impersonate A if you can obtain key 
 
In this attack adversary eavesdrops first message from A and converts to another message 
'
1s  
then sends to B. Next B receives message from adversary then protocol generates message 
'
3s  
and sends by channel. Only the adversary can convert this message to message
 3
s , in last step A 
generates message 4s  and sends to B without changing by the Adversary. Finally B accepted A 
(without received message from A) with received message from the adversary. If the adversary 
have had key then could be impersonated A and B (Tag and reader). 
 
3.3 Key Recovery 
 
In the Pasargad protocol used of two algorithms; Pars and Huffman which only encode data. So, 
we show how an adversary is able to recover key with following theorem: 
 
Theorem In the pasargad protocol, a passive attacker, after eavesdropping one authentication 
session between the tag and the reader, can recovery key from 2 2 .St K S K⊕ = →  
 
Proof: An adversary can eavesdrop some information after eavesdropping a session of the 
pasargad protocol. 
 
• First, adversary can eavesdrop 1 3,S S  and 4S  from channel.  
• Second, adversary can compute BobStr  from inverse of following relation 
 
• Third, adversary can compute 2St , and 2S  from  Huffman coding and Pasargad protocol 
respectively. 






Thus, we can impersonate tag with recover the key completely. 
 




In this paper, we have analyzed the structure and the security of a distance bounding protocol 
called Pasargad. First, we analyzed the structure of Pasargad protocol and showed that Huffman 
algorithm cannot generate two strings with same length for two messages with different 
frequency. So, the protocol cannot be carried out with Huffman coding and must be remove 
Huffman algorithm. Second, we presented an attack against the Pasargad protocol named 
Conditional Impersonation attack. Finally, we prove that an adversary can recover key of the 
Pasargad protocol. Hence, we conclude that the Pasargad protocol is not only unsecure but also is 
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